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Introduction
The regulation of financial markets has beco-
me one of the most discussed topics by both 
academics and practitioners in resent years. The 
terms such as Basel II, Solvency II, and MiFID 
(The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) 
are widely used by financial market players. This 
paper intends to contribute to these discussions 
as it tries to evaluate regulatory pressure on se-
lected banks around the world.
The basic aim of the paper is to assess the 
behavior of American and European banks, and 
to analyze their reaction to regulatory pressure 
(one of the forms of banking regulation). We try 
to answer two key questions: Does regulatory 
pressure induce American and European banks 
to increase their capital? Does the strengthening 
of capital requirements induce them to increase 
or decrease their portfolio riskiness?
To answer the key questions we estimate 
a modified version of the simultaneous equations 
model developed by SHRIEVES and DAHL [26]. 
In the model, regulatory pressure is one of the ex-
planatory variables and the dependent variables 
are changes in risk and capital. The model is 
modified in two main aspects; we first use more 
advanced approaches towards the regulatory 
pressure variable (we model the regulatory pres-
sure variable in three different ways), and two, we 
also include a year dummy variable to capture 
year-specific effects. There are many methods 
that can be used to estimate the model; we have 
chosen the method of two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimates in order to test for the robustness of 
the results.
Data for our research was obtained from 
BankScope, a database that has statement data 
on more than 11,000 banks worldwide. We take 
into consideration panel data for 1,263 Ameri-
can and European banks from the 2000-2005 
period.
As we will discuss later in the paper, the conclu-
sions of our research contribute to the literature 
by providing empirical support to the theories 
provided by SHRIEVES and DAHL [26], KIM and 
SANTOMERO, [15] and KOEHN and SANTO-
MERO [16].
This paper is organized as follows: the second 
part provides a theoretical framework for the 
research; the third part describes the model 
and data used; the fourth section discusses the 
results of our research and compares them with 
the findings of other authors; finally, the fifth part 
concludes the paper and state final remarks.
1 Theory Review
Several opinions on regulating bank capital 
exist. For instance, SANTOS [25] noted that 
moral hazard problems and their potential ex-
ternalities result from bank failures. In addition 
he stated that insurance schemes have proven 
successful in protecting a bank from sudden and 
severe deposit withdrawals, so called bank runs, 
but at a cost that leads to moral hazard.
There is a plethora of literature dealing with 
the capital and risk relationship; we can find 
a number of different theories that give con-
flicting predictions on whether more stringent 
capital regulation curtails or promotes bank 
performance and stability. One branch of litera-
ture introduces the stabilizing effects of capital 
requirements. The stabilizing effects are based 
on the option-pricing model. In this model, an un-
regulated bank takes excessive portfolio and le-
verage risks in order to maximize its shareholder 
value at the expense of deposit insurance (see 
FURLONG and KEELEY [8], KEELEY and FUR-
LONG [14]). While capital requirements cannot 
eliminate these moral hazard incentives, they can 
reduce them by forcing banks to absorb a larger 
part of potential losses. Therefore, the value of 
the deposit insurance option decreases and the 
incentives for excessive risk taking diminishes. 
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Thus, capital regulation leads to more capital and 
less risk taking, and hence to lower probability of 
a bank default.
Another branch of literature gives different pre-
dictions. KIM and SANTOMERO [15], KOEHN 
and SANTOMERO [16] agree with the above 
theory in that more stringent capital requirements 
force banks to increase their level of capital, but 
they argue that capital is very costly.
SHRIEVES and DAHL [26] give a different rati-
onale in regards to why banks that have built up 
capital have, at the same time, also increased the-
ir risk. They argue this is consistent with a number 
of hypotheses (bankruptcy cost avoidance, mana-
gerial risk aversion, etc) which are not mutually 
exclusive, meaning that each may underlie capital 
and risk decisions at any point in time in some 
subset of banks.
On the other hand, HEID, PORATH, and 
STOLZ [10] argue that the assumptions of the 
above theories are not realistic, as these theories 
abstract from rigidities and adjustment costs. 
However, the reality is somewhat different from 
the theory because banks may not be able to 
instantaneously adjust capital or risk due to ad-
justment costs or illiquid markets.
More recently, JEITSCHKO and JEUNG [13] 
presented a new unified approach in investiga-
ting the relationship between bank risk taking 
and bank capital. They introduced a model that 
incorporates the incentives of three agents (the 
deposit insurer, the manager, and the sharehol-
der). Their results show that a bank’s risk can 
either increase or decrease with capitalization. 
The final effect depends on the relative forces of 
the three agents.
An increasing number of papers have tried 
to test the above theories in order to find the 
empirical relationship between capital and risk 
adjustments (e.g. see Berger [4]). For a summary 
of the findings we refer to Section 4.4, where 
we compare our results with the results of other 
authors.
2 Building a Model
In this section we will discuss the capital 
and risk behavior of US and EU banks. We will 
introduce the Shrieves and Dahl simultaneous 
equations, and then we will describe the data 
and explain why the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation 
procedures are used. 
2.1 Model Specification
To our knowledge, we are the first to test and 
compare the capital and risk behavior of US and 
EU banks. We base our analysis of US and Euro-
pean banks’ capital behavior on the simultaneous 
equations model developed by SHRIEVES and 
DAHL [26]. This model is used to assess how 
banks react to requirements placed by the regu-
lator on their capital. An important aspect of the 
model is that it recognizes that changes in both 
risk and capital have endogenous (i.e. discretio-
nary) and exogenous components. In the model, 
observed changes in capital and risk levels 
include the two components, a discretionary ad-
justment and a change caused by factors exoge-
nous to the bank. When talking about exogenous 
changes to capital, these changes can result 
from enforced increases in capital required by 
regulators or unanticipated changes in earnings 
caused by fluctuations in income. With respect 
to risk, exogenous changes include unanticipated 
shocks to the national or local economy, such as 
the changing characteristics of a bank loan port-
folio or volatility of loan collateral such as real 
property. Hence, the model looks like:
ΔCAP
 j ,t
 = Δd CAP 
j ,t
 + E 
j ,t
  (1)
ΔRISK 
j ,t
 = Δd RISK
 j ,t
 + S
 j ,t
  (2)
where ΔCAP 
j ,t
 and RISK 
j ,t
 are the observed 
changes in capital and risk levels, respectively, 
for bank j in period t, the variables Δd CAP
j,t
 and 
Δd RISK
 j ,t
 are the discretionary changes in capital 
and risk while E
 j ,t
 and S
 j ,t
 are random shocks.
Following SHRIEVES and DAHL [26], the 
discretionary changes in capital and risk,
Δd CAP 
j,t
 and Δd RISK 
j ,t
, are modeled using the 
partial adjustment framework, thereby recognizing 
that banks may not be able to adjust their desired 
capital ratio and risk levels instantaneously. In this 
framework, the discretionary changes in capital and 
risk are proportional to the difference between the 
target levels and the observed levels in period t-1:
Δd CAP 
j ,t
 = α (CAP* 
j ,t
 - CAP 
j ,t-1
) (3)
Δd RISK
 j ,t
 = β (RISK* 
j ,t
 - RISK 
j ,t-1
) (4)
where CAP*
 j ,t
 and RISK*
 j ,t
 are bank j ’s target 
capital and risk levels, respectively; α, β are pa-
rameters.
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Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equati-
ons (1) and (2), the observed changes in capital 
and risk can be written as:
ΔCAP
 j ,t
 = (CAP*
 j ,t
 – CAP
 j ,t-1
) + E
 j ,t
  (5)
ΔRISK
 j ,t
 = (RISK *
 j ,t
 – RISK
 j ,t-1
) + S
 j ,t
 (6)
This means that the observed changes in 
capital in period t is a function of the target ca-
pital in period t (CAP*
 j ,t
), the capital in period t-1
(CAP
j ,t-1
), and random shocks E 
j ,t
. The observed 
changes in risk in period t is a function of the 
target risk level in period t (RISK*
 j ,t
), the risk 
level in period t-1 (RISK
 j ,t-1
), and random shocks 
S 
j ,t
. The target capital ratio and the risk level are 
not directly observable, but are assumed to be 
dependent on some set of observable variables 
describing the bank’s financial condition and the 
state of the economy in each country. AGGAR-
WAL and JACQUES [1] give an example of exo-
genously determined random shock on the bank 
that can influence its capital level; a change in the 
bank´s macroeconomic environment.
2.1.1 Definitions of Capital and Risk
In this study we will follow JACQUES and 
NIGRO [12], MURINDE and YASEEN [21], and 
others. We will use the following definition of 
capital (CAP): the ratio of total regulatory capital 
to risk-weighted assets (RCRWA). This definition 
has become more popular since the introduction 
of risk-weighted assets in Basel capital accords. 
As mentioned above, total capital represents total 
regulatory capital; it includes Tier 1 and Tier 2.
The definition of bank risk (RISK) is quite pro-
blematic and the literature suggests a number 
of alternatives, all of which are subject to some 
criticism. In this study we opt for the ratio of risk-
-weighted assets to total assets. This measure is 
in line with the standard work in this area. It was 
proposed by SHRIEVES and DAHL [22] and 
used subsequently by JACQUES and NIGRO 
[12], RIME [22], AGGARWAL and JACQUES 
[1], HEID, PORATH, and STOLZ [10], ROY [23], 
and many others. The rationale for using this ar-
bitrary measure is that portfolio risk is primarily 
determined by the allocation of assets across the 
different risk categories.
However, it should be pointed out that alter-
native (and probably even better) measures of 
risk (such as value at risk, economic capital, or 
the volatility of the market price of bank assets) 
were not available for the sample banks during 
the observed period, hence it was not possible to 
test for robustness of the results with respect to 
different definitions of risk.
2.1.2 Variables Affecting Changes in 
Banks’ Capital and Risk
The partial adjustment model, presented in 
equations (5) and (6), predicts that changes in 
capital in period t are a function of the target 
capital, the lagged capital, and any exogenous 
factors, while changes in risk in period t are 
a function of the target risk, the lagged risk, and 
any exogenous shocks. In the following section 
we introduce the possible explanatory variables, 
which are proxies for the target capital and risk 
levels, and their expected impact on banks’ ca-
pital and risk. All these variables have been used 
by SHRIEVES and DAHL [26], with the exception 
of the profitability indicator, emphasized by RIME 
[22] and ROY [23], and the year dummy variable, 
proposed by HEID, PORATH, and STOLZ [10] 
and used also by GODLEWSKI [9] or ROY [24]. 
The explanatory variables are: bank size (SIZE), 
profitability indicator (ROA), regulatory pressure 
(REG), current loan losses (LLOSS), changes in 
risk (ΔRISK) and capital (ΔCAP), and year dummy 
variable (dy2001 – dy 2005).
Size (SIZE)
SHRIEVES and DAHL [26], RIME [22], and 
others state that size may influence target risk 
and capital levels due to its relationship with risk 
diversification, the nature of bank investment op-
portunities or the bank ownership characteristics, 
and access to equity capital. As SHRIEVES and 
DAHL [26] note, “access to equity capital may 
affect the relative importance of bankruptcy cost 
avoidance or managerial risk aversion theories.” 
AGGARWAL and JACQUES [1] pointed out that 
larger banks may be willing to hold less capital 
owing to the fact that they have better ability to in-
crease capital if needed when compared to other 
banks. In addition, as noted by ROY [24], large 
banks carry out a wider range of activities which 
should increase their ability to diversify their port-
folio, and hence to reduce their credit risk. Thus, 
we will include the SIZE variable in the capital 
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and in the risk equations to capture size effects. 
SIZE will be measured as the natural log of bank 
total assets. SIZE variable is suppose to be inver-
sely related to changes in risk and capital.
Profitability Indicator (ROA)
RIME [22], ROY [23], and others argue that 
current profits (which are measured here as re-
turn on assets, ROA) may have a positive effect 
on banks’ capital as profitable banks may prefer 
to increase capital through retained earnings 
than through equity issues. Banks have to rely 
mainly on retained earnings to increase capital. 
The bank’s ROA is included in the capital equati-
on with an expected positive effect on capital.
Current loan losses (LLOSS)
Loan loss provisions represent funds that 
banks set aside to cover bad loans. We will follow 
the definition of ROY [24], which was also used 
by AGGARWAL and JACQUES [1], and approxi-
mate these losses (LLOSS) with the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to total assets. We can consider 
this ratio as a proxy for asset quality. Banks with 
lower asset quality (higher LLOSS) are expected 
to have higher risk. Therefore, we will include 
LLOSS in the risk equation with an expected 
positive effect on risk.
Changes in risk (Δ RISK) and capital (Δ CAP)
The theories discussed in Section 3 assume 
that capital and risk decisions are interdependent 
and determined simultaneously, which suggests 
the inclusion of Δ RISK in equation (7) and Δ CAP 
in equation (8). Following SHRIEVES and DAHL 
[26], we will include these two variables in the 
right part of the model in order to allow for the 
different relationships between them. By this 
inclusion we can find out whether changes in 
bank capital and asset risk are positively or ne-
gatively related to one another (or whether there 
is no relationship at all). Thus, at the end we can 
support one of the theory branches mentioned in 
Section 3.
Year dummy variables (dy 2001 – dy 2005)
HEID, PORATH and STOLZ [10], Roy [23], and 
others also used year dummy variable to capture 
further year specific effects. We will include this 
variable in the risk and capital equation as well. 
We will cover the six-year period from 2000 to 
2005. We will assign a dummy variable for each 
reference period, except for year 2000 in order to 
avoid perfect colinearity. These dummy variables 
are added to the model specification in order 
to take account of macroeconomic shocks (for 
example changes in the volume or in the structure 
of loan demands) that can systematically impact 
bank capital and credit risk ratios.
2.1.3 Modeling Regulatory Pressure
The main emphasis of this study is on the re-
gulatory pressure variable (REG). This variable is 
meant to capture the impact of the Basel capital 
requirements (the response of banks to the 8 % 
risk-based capital standard) as it describes the 
behavior of the banks that fell short of the regu-
latory standards. Moral hazard theory predicts that 
a bank approaching the regulatory minimum capi-
tal ratio may have an incentive to boost capital and 
reduce risk in order to avoid the regulatory costs 
triggered by a breach of the capital requirements. 
However, others argue that poorly capitalized 
banks may be tempted to take more risk in the 
hope that higher expected returns will help them 
increase their capital. We expect that regulatory 
pressure has a positive impact on changes in capi-
tal. Its impact on changes in risk is the question.
Tab. 1: Expected signs of bank characteristic variables
Name of Variable Change in Capital Change in Risk
SIZE - -
LLOSS +
ROA +
REG + ?
Source: own.
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Several approaches for modeling regulatory 
pressure exist. In this paper we will discuss only the 
capital volatility approach (for other approaches 
see MATEJAŠÁK [20]). Under this approach we 
define regulatory pressure as a dummy variable, 
which is 1 if a bank’s capital ratio is below the thre-
shold level which is equal to the minimum capital 
requirement plus one standard deviation of the 
bank’s own capital adequacy ratio, 0 otherwise.
REG = 1 if CAR < (8 % + bank-specific standard 
deviation of CAR)
 = 0 otherwise
Although the choice of one standard deviation 
is somehow arbitrary, the rationale for using this 
measure is that banks build a buffer above the 
regulatory minimum for precautionary reasons 
and the amount of this buffer depends on the 
volatility of capital ratio, so this approach utilizes 
more information than previous methods as it 
utilizes also volatility of CAR. This approach was 
suggested by ROY [24].
2.1.4 Specification
On the basis of the previous analysis, the model 
defined by equations (5) and (6) is specified as 
follows:
Δ CAP
 j ,t
 = α
0
 + α
1
 REG 
j ,t-1
 + α
2 
ROA
 j ,t
 + α
3 
SIZE
 j 
,t
+ + α
4 
RISK 
j ,t
 + α
5 
CAP
 j ,t -1
 + α
6 
dy2001 + …+
+α
9 
dy2005 + ε
 j ,t
 (7)
Δ RISK
 j ,t
 = β
0
 + β
1
 REG 
j ,t-1
 + β
2 
LLOSS
 j ,t
 + β
3 
SIZE 
j ,t
+
+β
4 
ΔCAP 
j ,t
 + β
5 
RISK 
j ,t-1
 + β
6 
dy2001 + …+ 
+ β
6 
dy2005 + υ
j ,t 
  (8)
where REG represents regulatory pressure 
defined:
REG = 1 if CAR < (8 % + bank-specific standard 
deviation of CAR)
 = 0 otherwise
2.2 Data Used
Data on the EU 15 and US banks were ob-
tained from BankScope, a database of bank 
account figures. The database is a joint product 
of Fitch Ratings (a major rating agency) and Bu-
reau Van Dijk (publisher of financial databases).
Banks that did not report their total capital 
ratio for at least two consecutive years were 
omitted from the data set. To obtain a homo-
genous sample, banks with capital ratio above 
100 % were treated as outliers and excluded 
from the sample. However, those banks that 
disappeared through mergers and acquisitions 
do remain part of the sample because their as-
sets and liabilities appear on the balance sheet 
of the acquiring bank. The figures are measured 
on a yearly basis which represents the highest 
periodicity for which data is systematically 
available.
All the variables used in this study were 
available on BankScope, except for the RISK 
variable. Therefore, the total capital level K = 
(Tier 1 + Tier 2), total assets (A), and the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) were extracted from the 
database in order to compute the RISK variable 
in two steps. In the first step risk-weighed assets 
were calculated (RWA), and in the second step 
the RISK variable was calculated.
1) CAR =              then RWA =
2) RISK =
The sample altogether consists of 5,323 ob-
servations on 1,263 US and EU-15 banks which 
were in existence between 2000 and 2005.
The following table shows the mean values of 
the sample for some bank characteristics for both 
American and European banks for each of the six 
sub-periods. The table also includes changes in 
risk and capital.
K
RWA
K
CAR
RWA
A
Tab. 2: Basic Sample Characteristic
 Number of banks Number of Observations
EU 15 580 2 116
USA 683 3 207
TOTAL 1 263 5 323
Source: Own calculations.
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2.3 Methodology
To solve the model, we estimate the system of 
simultaneous equations defined by (7) and (8) 
using both a two–stage least squares (2SLS) 
procedure, and three-stage least-squares (3SLS) 
procedure. Both techniques are used in order 
to test for robustness of the results. 2SLS fra-
mework allows us to take account of the simulta-
neity of banks’ adjustments in capital and risk. It 
recognizes the endogeneity of changes in capital 
and risk, so it is preferable for a single equation 
models that assumes either risk or capital to be 
an exogenous variable to the bank. 2SLS, unlike 
ordinary least squares (OLS), provides consistent 
parameter estimates.
3SLS technique also recognizes the endoge-
neity of changes in capital and risk. Thus, unlike 
OLS, it provides consistent estimates of the pa-
rameters. Moreover, it is preferable to two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) because 3SLS is a full 
information technique that estimates all para-
meters simultaneously. In addition, 3SLS takes 
into account the cross-equation correlations, so 
in using this technique we get estimates that are 
asymptotically more efficient than under 2SLS 
estimates. However, as noted by INTRILLIGATOR 
[11], 3SLS may be sensitive to misspecification 
or measurement errors. This suggests the com-
parison of the 2SLS and 3SLS results.
2SLS, as the name suggests, is done in two 
steps. In the first step we estimate the reduced 
form equations using OLS and save the fitted 
values for the dependent variables. This step is 
done to obtain consistent parameter estimates. In 
the second step we estimate the structural equa-
tion using OLS but replace all endogenous vari-
ables with their fitted values from the first stage.
3SLS method provides one additional step in 
the estimation procedure. This extra step allows for 
non-zero covariance between the error terms. It is 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS since the 
latter ignores any information that may be available 
as the errors across equations may be correlated.
The 2SLS and 3SLS procedure were run with 
the SAS software package.
3 Empirical Results
Estimation of simultaneous equations (7) and 
(8) using 2SLS produces essentially the same re-
sults as 3SLS. Therefore, the latter is retained for 
the remainder of the study as the 3SLS estimati-
on method is more efficient. The model results 
are shown in the following table:
Within the capital volatility approach, the REG 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank’s 
capital ratio is below the minimum level plus one 
bank-specific standard deviation, or equals 0 
otherwise. If REG is defined in this way, we find 
that there were 271 European cases (13 % of the 
EU sample) and 123 American cases (4 % of the 
US sample) that were under regulatory pressure.
Before analyzing the regulatory pressure and 
the overall relationship between capital and risk, 
we discuss the signs of the remaining variables 
and we start by presenting the results which are 
essentially the same for both US and EU banks.
Banks with lower asset quality (higher LLOSS) 
had greater risk. SIZE has a negative and signifi-
Tab. 3: Means of bank characteristics, by year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Grand 
averageEU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA EU 15 USA
CAR %
SIZE t
ROA t
LLOSS t
CAP t
RISK t
Δ CAP t
Δ RISK t
No. of obs.
14.0
8.1
0.7
0.003
14.0
0.66
-0.05
0.01
352
14.7
7.5
1.1
0.003
14.7
0.67
-0.38
0.01
633
15.0
7.5
0.7
0.004
15.0
0.66
0.98
0.00
434
15.0
7.6
1.1
0.004
15.0
0.67
0.37
0.00
612
14.9
7.6
0.6
0.004
14.9
0.66
-0.08
0.01
427
15.3
7.7
1.2
0.004
15.3
0.66
0.30
-0.01
572
15.2
7.8
0.8
0.004
15.2
0.67
0.28
0.01
431
15.2
7.7
1.2
0.003
15.2
0.67
-0.17
0.01
533
14.6
8.2
0.9
0.003
14.6
0.68
-0.53
0.00
416
15.0
7.9
1.2
0.002
15.0
0.68
-0.16
0.01
450
14.5
8.7
1.0
0.001
14.5
0.63
-0.12
-0.04
56
15.0
7.9
1.2
0.002
15.0
0.69
-0.03
0.01
407
14.9
7.8
1.0
0.003
14.9
0.67
0.03
0.00
Source: Own calculations.
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cant impact on capital, indicating that large Ame-
rican and European banks increased their capital 
less than other banks. One possible explanation 
is that these banks compete on international mar-
kets where they have to face fiercer competition 
with international banks that are, in general, less 
capitalized. ROY [23] states that large banks 
have easier access to capital markets and the-
refore they can operate with lower amounts of 
capital. Alternatively, as noted by ROY [23], this 
may be due to a diversification effect. The argu-
ment is that portfolio diversification reduces the 
probability of experiencing a large drop in the 
capital ratio, and the diversification increases 
with bank size.
The parameter estimates on lagged capital 
ratios were negative and significant with the para-
meter estimates of -0.37 for EU banks and -0.15 for 
US banks. The parameter estimates on lagged risk 
ratios were also negative and significant (-0.21 for 
EU banks and -0.10 for US banks.). In general, the-
se values imply adjustments of bank capital ratios 
and risk to desired levels. Looking at the amplitude 
of the estimates we can observe that European 
banks are quicker in the adjustment of both capital 
and risk to desired levels. The difference between 
US and European banks is that for American 
banks current earnings (ROA) have a significant 
and positive impact on changes in capital. This 
means that profitable US banks can more easily 
increase their capital through retained earnings.
Table 4 shows that this approach led to sig-
nificant estimates of the regulatory pressure in 
the capital equation for both European and US 
banks. Ceteris paribus, banks within one standard 
deviation of the threshold increase their capital 
more than other banks. European banks close to 
minimum regulatory requirements increased their 
capital to risk-weighted assets ratio by 0.7 per-
centage points more than other European banks. 
When compared to US banks, the impact of regu-
latory pressure is even greater in the USA. The US 
banks that were below the minimum requirement 
plus one standard deviation, increased their capi-
tal to risk-weighted assets ratio by 3.1 percentage 
points more than other US banks. Thus, the impact 
of the regulatory pressure is larger in amplitude 
for US banks than for EU banks. One possible 
explanation is that European banks may have gre-
ater difficulties in adjusting their capital or that US 
Tab. 4: Capital volatility approach – results
Estimation 
method
EU 15 USA
Variables Δ CAP
t
Δ RISK
t
ΔCAP
t
ΔRISK
t
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
ROA
t
SIZE
t
LLOSS
t
REG
t-1
RISK
t-1
CAP
t-1
Δ RISK
t
Δ CAP
t
Dum 2001
Dum 2002
Dum 2003
Dum 2004
Dum 2005
 0.1011
 -0.4558***
 0.6683*
 -0.3663***
11.5107***
 0.4683
 0.3908
 0.3125
 0.2749
 0.8317
1.36
-9.48
1.96
-18.98
3.52
1.31
1.10
0.90
0.77
1.18
-0,0042***
 2.2561***
-0.0013
-0.2109***
 0.0006
-0.0197***
-0.0181**
-0.0011
-0.0054
-0.0177
-4.61
5.05
-0.18
-15.18
0.54
-2.76
-2.54
-0.15
-0.75
-1.24
 0.4187***
 -0.1032**
 3.1327***
 -0.1501***
22.3755***
 0.8566***
 1.3273***
 0.6615***
 -0.0316
 0.1900
8.68
-2.28
7.59
-12.93
4.24
3.64
5.17
2.86
-0.13
0.77
-0.0015**
 0.4537***
-0.0477***
-0.1029***
 0.0034***
-0.0159***
-0.0254***
-0.0076*
 0.0030
 0.0058
-2.08
4.97
-6.71
-11.76
2.65
-4.16
-6.43
-1.92
0.73
1.38
Sys.weight.R2
No. Obs.
0.17
2 065
0.11
3 172
*** indicates significance at the 1 % level
** indicates significance at the 5 % level
* indicates significance at the 10 % level
Source: Own calculations.
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regulators have a stricter attitude towards underca-
pitalized banks so that US banks fear breaking the 
rules more than their European counterparties.
In the risk equation, nothing new occurs; the 
regulatory pressure has a significant and negati-
ve impact only for US banks. In conclusion, our 
findings provide basic evidence that Basel I stan-
dards have a positive effect on both US and Eu-
ropean banks’ capital adequacy ratios. Second, if 
under regulatory pressure, both European and US 
banks increase their capital. In addition, US banks 
also decrease their risk.
3.1 Comparison with Other Fin-
dings
As presented in Section 3, general theory provi-
des rather rivaling predictions on the relationship 
between capital and riskiness of banks. As shown 
in the following table, the empirical studies on the 
issue do not provide any clear conclusions either.
Although all of the authors listed in the above 
table based their analyses of bank behavior to 
large extent on the SHRIEVES and DAHL [26] mo-
del, the results and conclusions differ significantly. 
Our results are similar to the findings of SHRIE-
VES and DAHL [26] who analyzed the behavior 
of 1,800 US banks over 3 years, from 1984 until 
1986, just before the Basel I requirements were 
implemented. Our results are similar to theirs in 
the key conclusions: there is a significant positive 
impact of regulatory pressure on capital and a ne-
gative and significant impact on risk levels; chan-
ges in risk and capital levels are positively related.
The empirical findings of other research papers 
go in opposing directions. Table 7 shows that 
some authors find that regulatory pressure positi-
vely influences capital ratios in banks, while others 
find a negative relationship. When it comes to the 
impact of regulatory pressure on risk levels, their 
Tab. 5: Comparison with other findings
Year Sample and Period
Impact of regulatory 
pressure on CAP
Impact of regulatory 
pressure on RISK
Relationship between 
CAP and RISK
This study 2007
580 European banks and 683 
US banks over 6 years (2000 
– 2005)
+ for B (EU banks)
0 and + for B (US 
banks)
0 for B (EU banks)
- for B (US banks)
+ for B
Roy 2005
586 banks from G10 (with 
assets over $100 million) over 
8 years (1988 – 1995)
- and 0 for B + and 0 for B - for B
Murinde
and Yassen
2004
98 banks in 11 countries du-
ring 8 years (1995 – 2002)
- and + for B - and 0 for B - and 0
Abhiman
and Ghosh
2004
27 Indian banks over 6 years 
(1996 – 2001)
- for B - for B - for B
Heid, Porath 
and Stolz
2003
570 German savings banks 
over 8 years (1993 – 2000)
- and 0 for B + and 0 for B 0
Rime 2001
154 Swiss banks over 8 years 
(1989 – 1996)
0 for A
+ for U
0 for A
0 for U
0
Aggarwal
and Jacques
2001
1,685 US banks (with assets 
over $100 million) over 6 
years (1991 – 1996)
+ for A in 91
+ for U in 91
0 for A in 92
0 for U in 92
0 for A in 93-96
0 for U in 93-96
+ for A in 91
+ for U in 91
0 for A in 92
0 for U in 92
- for A in 93-96
- for U in 93-96
+ and – in 91
+ and – in 92
+ in 93-96
Shrieves and 
Dahl
1992
1,800 US banks over 3 years 
(1984 – 1986)
+ for B - for B + for B
Note: + significantly positive, - significantly negative, 0 insignificant
A adequately capitalized banks, U undercapitalized banks, B banks as a whole
Source: own.
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conclusions also differ considerably. Some au-
thors find a positive relationship while others find 
a negative relationship. Alternatively, some authors 
find no relationship. Finally, the conclusions also 
differ significantly when it comes to the question 
of the relationship between changes in risk and 
capital, as already mentioned in Section 3. 
Conclusion
Bank capital requirements play a prominent role in 
sustaining financial stability. There are different the-
ories that have rivaling predictions about how banks 
adjust their risk and capital behavior to imposed 
regulatory constraints. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to test and compare the capital and risk beha-
vior of US banks and banks from the EU 15 region. 
Using the freshest data from the 2000–2005 period 
we have estimated a modified version of the simulta-
neous equation model developed by SHRIEVES and 
DAHL [26]. The model is modified in two main as-
pects; we use more advanced approaches towards 
the regulatory pressure and we also include a year 
dummy variable to capture year-specific effects. We 
find that capital regulation has a significant impact 
on capital and risk taking for both US and EU 15 
banks in several respects. We find that both Euro-
pean and US banks close to the minimum regulatory 
threshold tend to increase their capital adequacy by 
increasing their capital. American banks in addition 
reduce their risk-taking. These findings indicate that 
expected penalties implied by possible breach of 
capital obligations have the desired effect on bank 
behavior and that bank capital regulation is effective 
in binding excessive risk taking.
Moreover, we find empirical evidence that even 
well capitalized EU banks try to maintain their ca-
pital on a safe level. This may relate to “cautionary 
behavior.” Finally, we observe a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between capital levels and risk ex-
posure for both US and EU banks. This means that 
banks raise their risk and capital simultaneously. 
Hence, we contribute to the literature by providing 
empirical support to the theories provided by SHRI-
EVES and DAHL [26], KIM and SANTOMERO 
[15], and KOEHN and SANTOMERO [16], who 
all predict a positive relationship between risk and 
capital adjustments. However, our results indicate 
that additions to capital over-compensate the incre-
ase in risk, so the regulatory standards do not have 
the unintended effect of increasing the probability 
of bank default.
This paper has been supported by Research 
Institutional Framework task IES (2005-2010) In-
tegration of the Czech economy into the European 
Union and its development.
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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF REGULATION OF BANKS IN THE US AND THE EU-15 COUNTRIES
Milan Matejašák, Petr Teplý, Jan Černohorský
The regulation of financial markets and banking industry has become one of the most discus-
sed topics by both academics and practitioners in recent years. One of the reason is the fact that 
bank capital requirements play a prominent role in sustaining financial stability. There are different 
theories that have rivaling predictions about how banks adjust their risk and capital behavior to 
imposed regulatory constraints. This paper intends to contribute to these discussions as it tries 
to evaluate regulatory pressure on selected banks around the world in the 2000-2005 period. To 
our knowledge, we are the first to test and compare the capital and risk behavior of US banks and 
banks from the EU 15 region in this period. In order to provide our analysis, we estimate a modified 
version of the simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl. This model analy-
zes adjustments in capital and risk at banks when they approach the minimum regulatory capital 
level. In the model, regulatory pressure is one of the explanatory variables and the dependent 
variables are changes in risk and capital. There are many methods that can be used to estimate 
the model; we have chosen the method of two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) estimates in order to test for the robustness of the results. The results indicate that 
regulatory requirements have the desired effect on bank behavior. We find that both European and 
US banks close to the minimum regulatory threshold tend to increase their capital adequacy by 
increasing their capital. Finally, we observe a positive and significant relationship between capital 
levels and risk exposure for both US and EU banks.
Key Words: banking regulation, Basel Capital Accord, capital adequacy, banks, simultaneous 
equations model, European Union.
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